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THE NEED FOR CLARIFICATION: SHOULD A CHILD
UNDER THE AGE OF SEVEN BE INCLUDED
WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF AUTOMOBILE GUEST STATUTES?'

INTRODUCTION

A motorist offers a ride to a child walking to school; the child
accepts. The motorist drives negligently, causing an accident in
which the child suffers serious injuries. The parents bring suit on
behalf of the child. An Ohio case, 2 based on the above facts, held
the child to be a guest within the terms of Ohio's Automobile Guest
Statute.' The application of such a guest statute deprives a child
1. This Comment is confined to the issue stated in the title. The
author expresses no opinion as to the merits of guest statutes per se. See
generally, for a discussion of the merits of guest statutes, Comment, The
Automobile Guest, 14 BOSTON U. L. REv. 728 (1934); Comment, Another
Decade Under The Guest Statute, 24 WASH. L. REv. 101 (1949); Comment,
The Case Against The Guest Statute, 7 WM. & MARY L. Rzv. 321 (1966).
Unless otherwise indicated, all references to a"child" or "children" in
the text refer to one under the age of seven. As stated in Rosenbaum v.
Raskin, 45 Ill. 2d 25, 257 N.E.2d 100 (1970), rev'g, 103 Ill. App. 2d 469, 243
N.E.2d 616 (1968):
From time immemorial the status of a minor of tender years has
been recognized in law to be different from that of one of more
mature years. . . . At common law an infant within seven years
of age could not be convicted on a criminal charge, as he was
conclusively presumed not to be capable of committing a crime,
and between the ages of 7 and 14 he was still presumed to be incapable; but between these ages this presumption might be overcome by proof....
Id. at 29, 257 N.E.2d at 103. In 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicle § 399.10 (1955) it
is stated:
Generally speaking, within the meaning of such statutes, a
guest is one who takes a ride in a car driven by another person,
merely for his own pleasure or on his own business, and without
making any return or conferring any benefit on the operator thereof; one who is carried in an automobile gratuitously, that is, one
who gives no compensation for the carriage....
Id. at 853.
2. Kemp v. Parmley, 17 Ohio Misc. 23, 243 N.E.2d 779 (Ohio C.P.
1967), aff'd, 16 Ohio St. 2d 3, 241 N.E.2d 169 (1968).
3. See Onio REv. CoDE § 4515.02 (Anderson 1953):
The owner, operator, or person responsible for the operation of
a motor vehicle shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from
injuries to or death of a guest, resulting from the operation of
said motor vehicle, when such guest is being transported without
payment therefor in or upon said motor vehicle, unless such injuries
or death are caused by the willful or wanton misconduct of such
operator, owner, or person responsible for the operation of said
motor vehicle.
Id. at 129.
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passenger in an automobile accident of a cause of action for damages against the negligent driver, unless there is a showing of some
type of "willful or wanton" 4 misconduct on the latter's part.
Since the enactment of the first automobile guest statute fortythree years ago,' there has been a conflict of authority over whether
a child under the age of seven should be included within the provisions of guest statutes.6 Two recent cases illustrate this diversity
of judicial opinion. 7 Considering the widespread use of the automobile to transport children, and the fact that thirty states have
enacted guest statutes,8 one can readily perceive the urgent need
for clarifying the terms of the various guest statutes as they apply
to children. The purpose of this Comment is to analyze the basic
questions confronting the courts in their respective determinations
of whether a child is a guest within the definition of a particular
guest statute. These questions are: Does the legislative purpose in
enacting the statute manifest an intent to exclude children from
qualifying as guests? 9 Must there be an invitation from the host
and an acceptance by the child before the statute is applicable?' 0
Can a child consent to the ride?" Does a child have the capacity
to voluntarily terminate a host-guest relationship?12
These are the basic questions considered by the courts in determining whether a child is to be included within the terms of a
particular guest statute. 13 The underlying philosophy of guest
4. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 34 (3rd ed. 1964).
5. See CONN. PUBIC ACTS ch. 308 (1927).
6. See Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 1304 (1951).
7. See Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 45 Ill. 2d 25, 257 N.E.2d 100 (1970);
Kemp v. Parmley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 3, 241 N.E.2d 169 (1968). The Rosenbaum
case will be described and analyzed later in this Comment.
8. See ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 95 (1958); ARK.STAT. ANN. § 75-913 to 915
(1947); CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 171-58 (West 1959); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-9-1 (1963); CONN. PUBLIC ACTS ch. 308 (1927); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21,
§ 6101 (1953); FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1965); GA. CODE ANN. § 68-301 (1933);
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 49-1401, 1402 (1947); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 , § 9-201
(Supp. 1967); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 47-1021, 1022 (Burns 1965); IOWA CODE
§ 321.494 (1966); KAN.STAT. ANN. § 8-122(b) (1961) ;Ky. STAT.§ 12-7 (1936);
MICH. COMp. LAWS § 257.401 (1948); MONT. REV. CODES AN. § 32-1113
(1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-740 (1943); Nm'. REV. STAT. § 41.180 (1957); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 64-24-1,-2 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-15-01 (1931); OHIO
RE. CODE § 4515.02 (Anderson 1953); OR& REV. STAT. § 30-115 (1953); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 46-801 (1962); S.D. CODE 44.0362 (1939); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
art. 6701(b) (1948); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 41-9-1, 2 (1953); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8-646-1 (1950); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1491 (1959); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 46.08.080 (1951); WYO.STAT. ANN. § 31-233 (1957).
9. See Horst v. Holtzen, 249 Iowa 958, 90 N.W.2d 41 (1958).
10. See cases cited note 53 infra.
11. See cases cited note 90 irfra.
12. See Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 45 Ill. 2d 25, 257 N.E.2d 100 (1970).
13. See, e.g., Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 45 IlL 2d 25, 257 N.E.2d 100 (1970).

statutes must first be considered in discussing whether the legislature intended to include or exclude minors under a particular statute. 14
I.

LEGISLATIVE

PURPOSE

Most courts have interpreted the underlying purposes of the
legislatures, in their respective enactment of guest statutes, as being
primarily designed to correct two evils: 15 (1) to protect a kindly
driver from an ungrateful rider;16 and, (2) to prevent collusion between drivers and riders who might attempt to defraud insurance
companies. 17 This protection, which relieves the driver of liability
for his ordinary negligence, is not absolute. It can be terminated
voluntarily by the passenger,"9 or by the aggravated misconduct of
the driver.'

9

Should the policy of protecting a kindly driver from an ungrateful occupant subordinate the policy of compensating children
for injuries resulting from the negligence of the driver? Several
jurisdictions have answered this question affirmatively. 20 In Horst
v. Holtzen,21 a mother accompanied her thirteen day old infant in a
car driven by another. An accident occurred as a result of the negligence of the driver, and the child was injured. In denying the
child's recovery, the court held that the purpose of the guest statute
was to protect one who gratuitously renders a service to another.
Since a child is capable of receiving a gratuitous service, the court
reasoned, a child can be a guest within the terms of the statute.-2
In Horst, the court placed undue emphasis on the legislative
policy of protecting the driver. The legislature did not intend to
provide drivers with absolute protection from the consequences of
their own negligence. 23 While the policy that an adult should not
14. See authorities cited note 1 supra.
15. See, e.g., Naphtali v. Lafazan, 8 App. Div. 2d 22, 186 N.Y.S.2d
1010 (1959):
The purpose of the enactment of the statute was twofold, to
activate the view that it is unfair for a guest to seek damages
from one who has benefited or accommodated him and to furnish
an antidote to fraudulent claims against insurance companies conceived by collusive host and guest.
Id. at 24, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 1014.
16. See, e.g., Buckner v. Vetterick, 124 Cal. App. 2d 417, 269 P.2d 67
(Dist. Ct. 1954); Kemp v. Parmley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 3, 241 N.E.2d 169 (1968);
Boyd v. Alguire, 82 S.D. 684, 153 N.W.2d 192 (1967).
17. See, e.g., Shiels v. Audette, 119 Conn. 75, 174 A. 323 (1934); Lynott
v. Sells, 158 A.2d 583 (Super. Ct. Del. 1958). See also Annot., 94 A.L.R.
1206 (1934).
18. See Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 45 Ill. 2d 25, 29, 257 N.E.2d 100, 103
(1970).
19. See generally W. PRossER, THE LAW oF ToRTs § 34 (3rd ed. 1964).
20. See, e.g., Horst v. Holtzen, 249 Iowa 958, 90 N.W.2d 41 (1958);
Linn v. Nored, 133 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
21. 249 Iowa 958, 90 N.W.2d 41 (1958).
22. Id. at 960, 90 N.W.2d at 44.
23. Id. at 962, 90 N.W.2d at 46.
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ungratefully bring suit against one who provides a gratuitous service may be morally justifiable, it does not follow that a child should
be prohibited from bringing suit.24 Also, an adult recognizes the
25
It
dangers inherent in automobile travel, while a child does not.
is possible, then, that the legislative policy of protecting the driver
was not meant to be applied against children.
The legislative purpose of enacting guest statutes to prevent
fraudulent insurance claims will not be defeated by excluding children from operation of such statutes. A child is legally incapable of
participating in fraudulent acts. 26 Although the parents of injured
children could institute fraudulent claims, it is the function of the
judiciary to discover such fraud and prevent its success. The policy
of protecting the thousands of children who travel by automobile
against drivers' ordinary negligence should not be destroyed by the
few fraudulent claims that might escape judicial scrutiny.
A third legislative purpose underlies enactment of guest statutes. This policy encourages motorists to provide transportation to
persons in need of it.27 If this function is truly one of the effects of
guest statutes, it is of questionable value when considered in relation to children. More motorists will offer rides to children. Children will enter a motorist's car without knowing the identity or driving ability of the motorist. Parents will not always know with
whom their children are riding. The social value that may be derived from encouraging drivers to give rides to adults becomes less
significant when children are the beneficiaries of those rides.
The question arises, however, as to whether the legislature intended, in enacting a guest statute, to exclude children from its
coverage. Several courts have held that since children are exempt
from liability in other areas of the law, the legislature presumed
that children would retain their unique status with respect to the
24. A further reason for allowing a child to bring suit would be the
possibility that the legislature did not intend to limit their access to the
courts. Guest statutes are not without their exceptions. (See, e.g., IOWA
CODE § 321.494 (1966) (intoxicated driver) ). Although children are not excluded in any of the statutes, this fact can mean two things. Either the
legislature, by not excluding them, intended children to be covered by the
statute; or, the contingency of the six year old plaintiff never occurred to
the legislators. At any rate, the fact that guest statutes are subject to exception should be considered in determining a child's standing to sue under guest statutes.
25. See Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 45 Ill. 2d 25, 28, 257 N.E.2d 100, 103
(1970).
26. See generally Palmer v. Miller, 323 Ill. App. 528, 43 N.E.2d 973

(1944).
27.

See generally 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 399.13 (1955).

various guest statutes. 2 For example, at common law, a child under the age of seven is incapable of the conduct necessary to constitute contributory negligence;2 9 and, a child under the age of
seven is conclusively presumed to be incapable of committing
0
crime
In Fuller v. Thrun,31 a four year old child was held not to be a
guest as defined under the Indiana guest statute. The court reasoned that if children up to a certain age are conclusively presumed
to be incapable of committing crime, and incapable of contributory
negligence, then, as a matter of law, they are incapable of having the
status of a guest under the statute. The Fuller court reasoned that
a guest statute implies that the rider, in order to become a guest,
must exercise the choice of whether to accept the ride. 2 Since a
minor is incapable of understanding the consequences of this choice,
he cannot be a guest. 3 In other words, the Fuller court held that
since other areas of the law take into account the age and inexperience of a minor, it is reasonable for judicial interpretation of guest
statutes to follow such a policy.
The reasoning in Fuller is sound. Minors are not held to the
same accountability as adults. 34 In other areas of the law it has
been recognized that a child under seven years of age ". . . lacks

the discretion, judgment and mental capacity to discern and appreciate circumstances of danger."35 Jurisdictions which hold a child
to be a guest are unrealistic in failing to decrease the responsibility
of the child-rider because of his inability to comprehend the consequences of the host-guest relationship. 36 Unfortunately, those jur37
isdictions are presently in the majority.
Only one legislature has explicitly included children within
the terms of its guest statute.3 8 One other state legislature, Florida,
28. See Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 45 Ill. 2d 25, 28, 257 N.E.2d 100, 103
(1970).
29. Walston v. Greene, 247 N.C. 693, 694, 102 S.E.2d 124, 125 (1958).
30. Kudrna v. Adamski, 188 Ore. 396, 216 P.2d 262 (1950). See also
Fuller v. Thrun, 109 Ind. App. 407, 31 N.E.2d 670 (1941); Annot., 16
A.L.R.2d 1297 (1950).
31. 109 Ind. App. 407, 31 N.E.2d 670 (1941).
32. Id. at 408, 31 N.E.2d at 672.
33. Id. at 408, 31 N.E.2d at 672. See also Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 45
Ill. 2d 25, 257 N.E.2d 100 (1970).
34. Walston v. Greene, 247 N.C. 693, 102 S.E.2d 124 (1958); Ruett v.
Nottingham, 200 Va. 722, 107 S.E.2d 402 (1959). See generally W. PROSSEa,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 128 (3rd ed. 1964).
35. Walston v. Greene, 247 N.C. 693, 695, 102 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1958).
36. See, e.g., Kemp v. Parmley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 3, 241 N.E.2d 169 (1968).
But see Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 103 Ill. App. 2d 469, 243 N.E.2d 616, rev'd,
45 Ill. 2d 25, 257 N.E.2d 100 (1970).
37. See Kemp v. Parmley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 3, 241 N.E.2d 169 (1968).
38. N.D. Cs.T. CODE § 39-15-02 (1931):
Any person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle moving upon any of the public highways of this state, and who while
so riding as such guest receives or sustains an injury, shall have no
right of recovery against the owner or driver or person responsible
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specifically excludes from the operation of its statute school children and students ". . . being transported to or from schools or
places of learning in this state." 39
Since the Florida statute excludes school children and students
in certain situations, the Florida courts have been faced with the
problem of interpreting this unique statutory provision. Several
cases have arisen in Florida defining what constitutes ". . . being
transported to or from school .... ,"4o In Barber v. Majestic Wood

Products,Inc.,41 several high school students skipped an afternoon
class and went for a ride with a friend. On the return trip to the
school an accident occurred. The students sued the driver. The
court held that since the excursion was unauthorized by the school,
the minors were not being transported to or from school as required by the statute, and they had to allege and 42
prove gross negligence on the part of the driver in order to recover.
In other cases, the Florida courts have reasoned that since the
legislature specifically excluded school children and students from
operation of the guest statute, minors, by implication, are guests in
4
all other situations involving transportation in an automobile.
However, the apparent uncertainty of legislative intent as to
whether to include children under seven within the guest statute
44
has led to a variety of cases involving the definition of a "school,"'
the status of a child at an extracurricular school event, 43 and the
46
definition of "being transported to school."
In Nordane v. Richardson,47 the student injured was of colfor the operation of such vehicle. In the event that such person
while so riding as such guest is killed or dies as the result of an
injury sustained while so riding as such guest, then neither the estate nor the legal representatives nor heirs of such guest shall have
any right of recovery against the driver or owner of said vehicle
by reason of the death of such guest. If such person so riding as a
guest is a minor and sustains an injury or is killed or dies as a result of injury sustained while so riding as such guest, then the
parents, guardian, legal representatives, and heirs of such minor
shall have no right of recovery against the driver or owner or
person responsible for the operation of said vehicle for injury sustained as a result of the death of such minor.
39. FL. STAT. § 320.59 (1965).
40. See, e.g., Moore v. Schortinghouse, 189 So. 2d 377 (Dist. Ct. App.
Fla. 1966); Summersett v. Linkroum, 44 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1950).
41. 195 So. 2d 593 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1967).
42. Id. at 595.
43. See, e.g., Moore v. Schortinghouse, 189 So. 2d 377 (Dist. Ct. App.
Fla. 1966).
44. Id. at 378.
45. See Farrey v. Bettendorf, 96 So. 2d 889, 893 (Fla. 1957).
46. Summersett v. Linkroum, 44 So. 2d 662, 663 (Fla. 1950).
47. 168 So. 2d 550 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1964).

lege age. The court held that the legislative exclusion of school
children was not applicable solely to children of tender years, and
that a college student came within the terms of the exception.4
The court, in Nordane, interpreted the legislative intent to exclude
children and students from the operation of the guest statute only
if the child was being transported to or from school. This interpretation could lead to results inconsistent with the rule of the Barber
case. For example, while a person who offers a gratuitous ride
to a child on the way to school is liable for his own ordinary negligence, 49 a person who takes a child for a ride, knowing that the child
is skipping classes, is not liable for his own negligence. 5° Also, this
policy would inhibit the practice of providing rides for children on
their way to school and encourage providing rides for children for
any other reason. The negative social value of such a policy is obvious.
It is submitted that legislatures should explicitly include children within the terms of their particular guest statute, if such is
their intent. The policy of protecting children from their own inexperience and lack of judgment has been recognized in other areas of
the law. 51 The courts should interpret legislative purpose in enacting guest statutes as excluding children, unless the legislature
52
specifically states that children are to be included.
II.

INVITATION AND ACCEPTANCE

Several courts have required an invitation by the host and an
acceptance by the child-rider as prerequisites to the operation of
guest statutes to minors.5" One view has been that a minor cannot
be a guest since minors lack the legal capacity to accept a ride.4
Another view has been that the child becomes a guest if the ride is
accepted by a parent or guardian on the child's behalf."
It is submitted that the courts, by requiring an invitation and an
acceptance before permitting operation of the guest statute, are impliedly recognizing the efficacy of the doctrines of assumption of
risk and contributory negligence. For example, a guest who accepted a ride has been held to have assumed the risk of the known
incompetence of the driver, 6 as well as certain other risks. 7 Since
48. Id. at 551.
49. See Summersett v. Linkroum, 44 So. 2d 662, 664 (Fla. 1950).
50. Barber v. Majestic Wood Products, 195 So. 2d 593, 595 (Dist. Ct.
App. Fla. 1967).
51. See Walston v. Greene, 247 N.C. 693, 694, 102 S.E.2d 124, 125 (1958).
52. Cf. Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 45 11. 2d 25, 257 N.E.2d 100 (1970).
53. See, e.g., Horst v. Holtzen, 249 Iowa 958, 90 N.W.2d 41 (1958).
Contra,Green v. Jones, 136 Colo. 512, 319 P.2d 1083 (1957).
54. Green v. Jones, 136 Colo. 512, 517, 319 P.2d 1083, 1089 (1957).
55. Whitfield v. Bruegel, 134 Ind. App. 636, 638, 190 N.E.2d 670, 672
(1963).
56. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 32, at 460-63 (3rd ed. 1964).
57. Id. (e.g. tendency to drive while intoxicated).
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assumption of risk requires that the person know and understand the
risk he is incurring,5 8 a child cannot possibly assume the risk of conditions which he is incapable of recognizing or understanding. "
Therefore, for a court to hold that a child can accept a ride, it must
also hold that a child can appreciate the risks and dangers inherent
in automobile transportation.
A more desirable social policy is that formulated by the court in
Green v. Jones.60 In Green, a two year old child was injured from
a fall out of a car through a door which was allegedly defective.
The court held that an invitation and corresponding acceptance are
prerequisites to the operation of the Colorado guest statute. The
court also held that the child was incapable of accepting a ride or
of being a guest:
.. . [the minor] was not possessed of any of the faculties of
an adult person, was incapable of knowing or anticipating danger or avoiding the same, incapable of assuming the
risk, incapable of accepting the status of a guest.6 1
The court then took judicial notice that a two year old child is in62
competent to accept or reject an invitation.
The Green court clearly recognized the injustice of imputing to
a child the exercise of the judgment and experience of a more mature person. A two year old child could not know whether the
driver is competent. By holding a child to be a guest, the court
would be concluding that the child can understand the legal consequences of his acceptance of the ride. 63
It is submitted that in determining whether a child can accept
a ride, the court should follow a more subjective standard. Rather
than holding that a child is capable of accepting a ride merely because he is physically able to enter a car, 4 the courts should take
account of the child's age, experience, and judgment. 65 One possi58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 461.
Id.
136 Colo. 512, 319 P.2d 1083 (1957).
Id. at 515, 319 P.2d at 1087.
Id. at 516, 319 P.2d at 1089.
Coffman v. Godsoe, 142 Colo. 575, 351 P.2d 808 (1960):
Our own precedents, therefore, reveal the existence of the following principles: First, that the guest statute creates a special status and special rights and obligations; second, that the guest status contemplates that the guest accepted the relationship with its
attendant hazards; third, that force or lack of capacity nullify the
acceptance which is essential to the host-guest relationship.
Id. at 578, 351 P.2d at 812.
64. Cf. Lombardo v. DeShance, 167 Ohio St. 431, 435, 149 N.E.2d 914,
918 (1958).
65. See Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 45 111. 2d 25, 257 N.E.2d 100 (1970).

ble standard that might be applied to children is the formula used
in determining whether a child is capable of contributory negligence. Such a formula considers that which is reasonable for children of like age, intelligence, and experience. It accounts for the
capacity of the particular child to appreciate the risk and to form a
reasonable judgment."
Historically, the law has recognized that the responsibility of a
person should increase with his age. For example, a child under
seven cannot be guilty of a crime at common law;

7

and, a child at

68

age fifteen is judged by a different standard than a child at age
sixteen.6 9 Courts should focus less on the objective standard of
mechanical acceptance of a ride and consider instead the subjective
factor of whether a child can understand the legal consequences of
accepting a ride. Accordingly, the courts should recognize that the
younger the child, the less capable he is of accepting a ride.
Assuming that the child is incapable of accepting a ride, can
a parent accept the ride for the child, thereby invoking the operation
of the guest statute? A California court, in Buckner v. Vetterick, 0
answered this question in the affirmative. In Buckner, a parent accompanied both her fifteen month old child and her twenty-six
month old child on a ride in an automobile driven by another. The
court held the children to be guests and declared:
Many decisions of more importance and involving greater
hazards are made by parents for their children daily.....
[T]hus a parent may speak and act for his child when
the child is legally incapable of acting for itself and others
may properly rely on the action of the parent in such circumstances. 71
The Buckner court gave no indication of when a child becomes legally capable of acting for himself. Presumably, when the child
reaches a certain age, the parent will no longer be able to accept the
ride for him.
The Buckner decision does not take into account the viewpoint
of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: ". . . [A] child who suffers physical harm is not barred from recovery by the negligence of
his parent, either in the parent's custody of the child or otherwise."'7 2 For example, a parent might be negligent in accepting
a ride for the child with a driver whose incompetence should have
been known by the parent. However, under the rule enunciated in
Buckner, the child would be a guest and incapable of recovering for
any injuries sustained as a result of the driver's incompetence.
66.

See, e.g., W. PnossER, THE LAW oF TORTS

§

32

67.
68.

(3rd ed.

1964).

See cases cited note 30 supra.
See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 673 (1871).
69. See, e.g., PA. STAT. Am. tit. 61, § 681 (1871).
70. 124 Cal. App. 2d 417, 269 P.2d 67 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal. 1954).
71. Id. at 418, 269 P.2d at 69.
72.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§

488 (1965).
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Since an acceptance is a prerequisite to the operation of the
guest statute, 3 the California courts must first determine whether
the child was capable of accepting the ride.14 While California requires an acceptance, it has not yet adopted the policy of Colorado
by ruling, as a matter of law, that a child is incapable of accepting a
ride or of being a guest.7 5 Rather, the California courts have held

that parents can accept for the child and thus satisfy the requirement of acceptance.7 6 In California, therefore, a child might be incapable of accepting a ride and still be a guest.
In Ohio, an acceptance is not a prerequisite to the operation of
the guest statute.7 7 In Kemp v. Parmley,78 the court held: "...
Assent to the motor vehicle transportation is not ordinarily necessary. Consequently, a child of tender years may be a guest
within contemplation of the statute. '79 The Ohio courts have held
that the ordinary meaning of the word guest requires only the giving of hospitality. 0 The mere receipt by the rider of the driver's
hospitality creates a guest status,8 ' even though the rider may be
mentally incapable of accepting an invitation to ride in that automobile.82 In Barney v. Sharpton, s 3 a Pennsylvania court, applying Ohio law, held that a child of tender years, as a matter of law,
is not precluded from being a guest under the Ohio statute.84
Obviously, the requirement of an acceptance has created difficulties for the courts in determining whether a minor can accept a
73.

CAL. VE CLE CODE § 17158 (1959):
No person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle upon a
highway without giving compensation for such ride, nor any other
person, has any right of action for civil damages against the
driver of the vehicle or against any other person legally liable for
the conduct of the driver on account of personal injury to or the
death of the guest during the ride, unless the plaintiff in any such
action establishes that the injury or death proximately resulted
from the intoxication or wilful misconduct of the driver.
74. See, e.g., Rocha v. Hulen, 6 Cal. App. 2d 245, 44 P.2d 478 (Dist.
Ct. App. Cal. 1935).
75. Compare Buckner v. Vetterick, 124 Cal. App. 2d 417, 419, 269 P.2d
67, 69 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal. 1954) with Green v. Jones, 136 Colo. 512, 517,
319 P.2d 1083, 1089 (1957).
76. See, e.g., Buckner v. Vetterick, 124 Cal. App. 2d 417, 419, 269
P.2d 67, 69 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal. 1954).
77. See Kemp v. Parmley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 3, 4, 241 N.E.2d 169, 170
(1968).
78. Id.
79. 16 Ohio St. 2d at 4, 241 N.E.2d at 170 (1967).
80. See, e.g., Lombardo v. DeShance, 167 Ohio St. 431, 436, 149
N.E.2d 914, 918 (1958).
81. Id. at 433, 149 N.E.2d at 916 (1958).
82. Id.
83. 20 Beaver 22 (Pa. C.P. 1958).
84. Id. at 26.

ride, 85 and, if so, what constitutes an acceptance.8 6 Courts have
held that an invitation and acceptance are not required in order to
create a host-guest relationship. However, no case has found an
occupant to be a guest 8 7 in the absence of either express or implied
consent on the part of the occupant. 88 Consent can be a prerequisite to allowing the driver to invoke the statute; yet, acceptance
is not necessary.8 9 A person may be physically present in the car,
but not give his consent. Consent differs from acceptance, since the
latter can be the mere mechanical act of remaining in the car. For
example, a rider can withdraw his consent to the ride by protesting
that the driver is driving negligently; however, it may be unsafe for
the rider to leave the car. In such a situation, the rider is accepting the ride, but not consenting to it.
HI. CONSENT
It is sound policy to hold that an involuntary occupant cannot
be a guest.90 A person who is forced to ride with a driver should
be protected from the ordinary negligence of the driver. Otherwise,
a kidnapped person could be classified as a guest under most guest
statutes. The nature of a guest statute implies that one must exercise a choice in order to become a guest.9 1 However, does a child
have the capacity to exercise the choice and consent requisite to the
operation of the guest statute?
The Illinois Supreme Court has ruled that a child cannot appreciate the consequences of a host-guest relationship, is incapable
of giving consent, and is therefore incapable of being a guest.92
Other jurisdictions have held that while a child may be incapable
of giving consent, it may be given by the parents for the child,
thereby making him a guest.93 No case has expressly repudiated
94
the doctrine of implied or expressed parental consent.
Courts are quite consistent in holding a child to be a guest
85. See cases cited note 75 supra.
86. See, e.g., Rocha v. Hulen, 6 Cal. App. 2d 245, 248, 44 P.2d 478, 482
(Dist. Ct. App. Cal. 1935).
87. See Kemp v. Parmley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 3, 241 N.E.2d 169 (1968).
88. See generally 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 399.10 (1955).
89. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Bruegel, 134 Ind. App. 636, 638, 190 N.E.2d
670, 673 (1963).
90. Fuller v. Thrun, 109 Ind. App. 407, 31 N.E.2d 670 (1941): "It is
clear, therefore, that one forced against his will to ride with the driver of
a motor vehicle could not be said to be riding as a guest." Id. at 409,
31 N.E.2d at 672.
91. See, e.g., Kudrna v. Adamski, 188 Ore. 396, 216 P.2d 262 (1950).
92. See Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 45 Ill. 2d at 28, 257 N.E.2d at 103 (1970).
93. See, e.g., Wood v. Morris, 109 Ga. App. 148, 135 S.E.2d 484 (1964).
94. See, e.g., Lynott v. Sells, 158 A.2d 583 (Super. Ct. Del. 1958): "In
the jurisdictions which except minors from the operation of the Guest
Statute the exception is limited to minors who are guests without parental
permission." Id. at 585.
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where there is parental consent for the child to ride.9 5 A carefully
worded dissent, in Chancey v. Cobb,9 6 expressed the attitude that
since the law assumes a guest to have consented to any injuries he
suffers through the ordinary negligence of the driver, allowing a
parent to consent for the child to become a guest permits a parent
to commit a tort against his child.97 In Chancey, the parents of a
minor of tender years gave consent for the child to accompany the
defendant in an automobile. An accident occurred in which the
child was killed. The majority held the child to be a guest and
stated:
The great weight of authority in jurisdictions where
this question has been decided is that the status of a minor
child riding as a passenger in an automobile follows that of
its parents or natural guardian, if such parent or natural
guardian, if such parent or natural guardian is also riding
with it .... 98

It appears that the courts, in their search for parental consent,
have considered the relationship of the parties who have custody
of the child as well as the degree of restriction on such custody. For
example, where the child is in the custody of relatives, the courts
are more likely to find parental consent to the ride99 and hold the
child to be a guest. Where the child is in the custody of a stranger,
on the other hand, the courts are less likely to imply parental consent.1 00
The judicial authority holding that a child is a guest where
there has been parental consent to the ride does not create favorable public policy. A child is being entrusted to the custody of
the driver. Instead of increasing the standard of care required of
the driver, the courts relieve him of exercising even ordinary care
95. See, e.g., Chancey v. Cobb, 102 Ga. 636, 640, 117 S.E.2d 189, 193
(1960); Whitfield v. Bruegel, 134 Ind. App. 636, 190 N.E.2d 670 (1963);
Welker v. Sorenson, 209 Ore. 402, 306 P.2d 737 (1957); Favatella v. Poulsen,
17 Utah 2d 24, 403 P.2d 918 (1965); Hart v. Hogan, 173 Wash. 598, 24
P.2d 99 (1933).
96. 102 Ga. 636, 640, 117 S.E.2d 189, 193 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
97. Id. at 640, 117 S.E.2d at 193.
98. Id. at 638, 117 S.E.2d at 190. See also Favatella v. Poulsen, 17
Utah 2d 24, 403 P.2d 918 (1965):
To espouse plaintiff's theory of nonconsensuality of a minor in
the 'guest' statute sense would be to allow recovery by a gestating,
unborn, injured infant, where its mother, truly a guest, suffers a
miscarriage, the facts of life of which may have been a complete
mystery to the Good Samaritan Host.
Id. at 24, 403 P.2d at 918.
99. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Bruegel, 134 Ind. App. 636, 190 N.E.2d 670
(1963); In re Wright's Estate, 170 Kan. 600, 228 P.2d 911 (1951).
100. See, e.g., Wood v. Morris, 109 Ga. App. 148, 135 S.E.2d 484 (1964).

in transporting the child. '1 1 The courts are denying a child of
limited experience and judgment the right to be compensated for
injuries caused by the ordinary negligence of another.
An alternative to the decisions holding that parental consent is
sufficient to make the child a guest is that the status of the child
follows that of the parent only where the latter accompanies the
child on the ride. This rule would give some protection to the
child. The parent would be present to terminate the host-guest relationship between driver and child at any time during the journey. For example, if the driver began operating the vehicle in a
negligent manner, the parent could then terminate the host-guest
relationship, and the child would not be treated as a guest. Thus,
the child could be compensated for his injuries.
IV.

TERMINATION OF THE HOST-GUEST RELATIONSHIP

Every jurisdiction which has enacted a guest statute has provided that certain occurrences terminate the host-guest relationship. 10 2 A driver is not completely free from the consequences of
his own negligence. In Ohio, for example, a driver whose misconduct is "wilful or wanton" cannot claim the protection of the guest
statute in suits for personal injuries. 10 ' In South Dakota, if any
type of payment is the motivating influence to the driver in fur1 04
nishing the transportation, then the guest statute is inapplicable.
Does a child have the capacity to satisfy the requirements necessary
to terminate the host-guest relationship?
The courts that hold a child to be a guest merely because he is
in the custody of the driver do not consider the question of whether
the child has the capacity to terminate the relationship. 0 5 If a
parent consents to the ride, but does not accompany the child, there
is no assumption that the child can exercise the discretion necessary to terminate the ride. 0 6 It has been held that where a protesting guest demands exit from the car, and the driver refuses such
request, the person ceases to have the status of a guest. 0 7 However, the courts have not considered the fact that a child may lack
the judgment to realize that he can terminate the host-guest relationship by demanding that he be let out of the car.10 8
101. See Chancey v. Cobb, 102 Ga. 636, 640, 117 S.E.2d 189, 193 (1960)
(dissenting opinion).
102. See Automobile Guest Laws Today, 27 INS. CouNSE. J. 223 (1960)
(review of particulars in various states).
103. See OHIO REV. CODE § 4515.02 (Anderson 1953).
104. See, e.g., Boyd v. Alguire, 82 S.D. 684, 153 N.W.2d 192 (1967).
105. See generally Kemp v. Parmley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 3, 241 N.E.2d 169
(1968).
106. See Rosenbaum v. Raskin, 45 Ill. 2d 25, 28, 257 N.E.2d 100, 103
(1970).
107. Andrews v. Kirk, 106 So. 2d 110, 117 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1958).
108. See generally Walston v. Greene, 247 N.C. 693, 694, 102 S.E.2d 124,
126 (1958).
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One of the means by which a host-guest relationship can be
terminated
is by compensating the driver.10 9 In Snelling v. Pieper, 110 a twelve year old boy was placed, by his father, in the custody of the defendant. The defendant was to receive fifteen dollars a week to care for the boy. Defendant, with the father's special permission, took the boy on a three week camping trip. An
accident occurred on the return trip from the camping grounds.
The court held the child not to be a guest and stated that the motivating influence of furnishing the transportation was the contract
to care for the boy.'1 1 Thus, payment by the parent to the driver
discharged the host-guest relationship.
In Langford v. Rogers, 1 2 a child was on a toboggan attached to
a sled which was being pulled by a car. An accident occurred and
the child was killed. The court held that the child was transported
for his own pleasure, did not compensate the driver for the transportation, and was, therefore, a guest." 3 The court in Langford
never considered the age of the decedent. A two year old child, a
six year old child, and a twelve year old child could each be considered equally capable of realizing that payment to the driver terminates the host-guest relationship. Some states, however, do
make allowances for age by recognizing that children under a certain age are incapable of the same standard of judgment as adults." 4
It seems reasonable to recognize, in a situation involving application of a guest statute, that children under a certain age do not
have the capacity to understand the legal effect of paying for a ride.
The Langfo rd court should have considered this question.
Courts have assumed that a child can pay for transportation in
order to discharge the host-guest relationship. In Shiels v. Audette,1" 5 a child rode in the back of the defendant's truck. The defendant had knowledge of the child's presence. The court held the
child to be a guest on the grounds that there was no evidence that
the child paid the defendant for the transportation. 1
Courts
which have held a child to be a guest have failed to face the issue of
whether a child has the mental capacity to terminate the host-guest
7
relationship.'
109.
(1964).
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See, e.g., Sinclair v. Barber, 236 Ore. 599, 601, 390 P.2d 321, 324
178 Neb. 818, 135 N.W.2d 707 (1965).
Id. at 821, 135 N.W.2d at 711.
278 Mich. 310, 270 N.W. 692 (1936).
Id. at 315, 270 N.W. at 696.
See, e.g., Sheets v. Pendergrast, 106 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1960).
119 Conn. 75, 174 A. 323 (1934).
Id. at 76, 174 A. at 325.
See, e.g., Kemp v. Parmley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 3, 241 N.E.2d 169 (1968).

A better policy would be to recognize, as a matter of law, that a
child cannot become a guest unless he has the capacity to terminate
the host-guest relationship. Guest status is voluntary and requires
a choice on the part of the rider whether to continue such a relationship.""8 It is unrealistic for the courts to hold that a child can
choose whether he desires a continuation of the host-guest relationship. 119 A child may not have the competence to make such a
choice.
V.

A POTENTIAL SOLUTION

An Illinois case may eventually serve as a guide for other guest
statute jurisdictions. In Rosenbaum v. Raskin,120 the four year old
niece of the defendant was injured when the child's hand was
pinched by the door of the defendant's car. The plaintiff contended that, as a matter of law, a minor of four years could not be
a guest, or, in the alternative, that there must be an expressed or
implied parental consent in order to apply the guest statute. The
Appellate Court of Illinois reversed the decision of the Circuit Court
of Cook County and held the child to be a guest.
The appellate court in Rosenbaum reasoned that-the guest statute did not provide an exception in favor of children. 121 The court
stated that whether there was implied parental consent in this particular case was for the jury to decide. 122 The court impliedly rejected the concept that an infant is totally incapable of becoming a
guest as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court of Illinois, 123 in reversing the appellate
court, held that ". . . it would be unreasonable to assume that the
legislature intended the statute to apply to a child of the tender age
of seven years or under."' 24 The Supreme Court of Illinois, in what
appears to be the best policy decision of the courts having considered the question, limited the application of the Illinois guest statute to children under seven years old. It is submitted that the
standards adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court should be considered in all other jurisdictions which have guest statutes. The
Illinois Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that, in the application of guest statutes, the status of a child should be different
26
from that of a person of more mature years.
118. Kudrna v. Adamski, 188 Ore. 396, 216 P.2d 262, 264 (1950).
119. See, e.g., Ruett v. Nottingham, 200 Va. 722, 107 S.E.2d 402 (1959):
"The younger the child and the less able to look out for himself the greater
the care which may reasonably be expected of the motorist.... .Id.
at
724, 107 S.E.2d at 404.
120. 103 Ill. App. 2d 469, 243 N.E.2d 616, rev'd, 45 Ill. 2d 25, 257 N.E.2d
100 (1970).
121. Id. at 473, 243 N.E.2d at 619.
122. Id. at 475, 243 N.E.2d at 621.
123. 45 Ill.
2d 25, 257 N.E.2d 100 (1970).
124. Id. at 28, 257 N.E.2d at 103.
125. Id.
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The Rosenbaum court recognized that the rationale behind the
guest statute was to protect one who gratuitously renders a service.126 However, the court noted that in other areas of the law
children are not held to the same accountability as adults:
• . . [T] he recognition, by the law, of the status of infants,
and their exemption up to a certain age from liability under the law, is so well known that it must be presumed
that the legislature, in enacting such a statute as the one under consideration, did not intend by the general language
used to include within its provisions a class of persons
which the law has universally recognized to be utterly devoid of responsibility.' 2 7
The Rosenbaum decision thus places the burden of including children. within the terms of the guest statute upon the legislature.
In the absence of an explicit legislative declaration, a child is presumed incapable of being a guest in Illinois.
CONCLUSION

It is submitted that the tremendous volume of interstate travel
requires a clarification of guest statutes as they apply to children. 128
In determining whether a child should be included within the terms
of a guest statute, the courts must choose between conflicting policies. One policy is to recognize the unique status of children in the
law, while the other is to protect a driver from an ungrateful guest.
The sounder view is to recognize the incapacity of the child to understand the legal consequences of both the host-guest relationship
and the failure to terminate that relationship. It is submitted that
the jurisdictions having guest statutes should adopt the result of the
Rosenbaum case. The burden should be on the legislatures to decide whether to include children within the terms of the statutes;
but, in the absence of such a clear legislative mandate, the courts
should protect children under seven from the negligence of drivers.
Where the Rosenbaum reasoning is accepted, guest statutes will reflect a more realistic appraisal of the relationship between a driver
and his child-rider.
CORREALE F. STEVENS

126. Id. at 27, 257 N.E.2d at 102.
127. Id. at 28, 257 N.E.2d at 103.
128. See W. PRossE, THn LAW OF TonTs § 34 (3rd ed. 1964): "There is
perhaps no other group of statutes which have filled the courts with appeals
on so many knotty little problems involving petty and otherwise entirely
inconsequential points of law." Id. at 191.

